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Abstract. Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design
of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually
neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum
games. We study such games and show that a large class of these games, includ-
ing games where the individual objectives are mean- or discounted-payoff, or
quantitative reachability, and show that they do not only have a solution, but a
simple solution. We establish the existence of Nash equilibria that are composed
of k memoryless strategies for each agent in a setting with k agents, one main
and k − 1 minor strategies. The main strategy describes what happens when all
agents comply, whereas the minor strategies ensure that all other agents immedi-
ately start to co-operate against the agent who first deviates from the plan. This
simplicity is important, as rational agents are an idealisation. Realistically, agents
have to decide on their moves with very limited resources, and complicated strate-
gies that require exponential—or even non-elementary—implementations cannot
realistically be implemented. The existence of simple strategies that we prove in
this paper therefore holds a promise of implementability.
1 Introduction
The construction of correct and efficient computer systems (both hard- and software)
is recognised to be an extremely difficult task. Formal methods have been exploited
with some success in the design and verification of such systems. Mathematical logic,
automata theory [17], and model-checking [12] have contributed much to the success
of formal methods in this field. However, traditional approaches aim at systems with
qualitative specifications like LTL, and rely on the fact that these specifications are
either satisfied or violated by the system.
Unfortunately, these techniques do not trivially extend to complex systems, such as
embedded or distributed systems. A main reason for this is that such systems often con-
sist of multiple independent components with individual objectives. These components
can be viewed as selfish agents that may cooperate and compete at the same time. It is
difficult to model the interplay between these components with traditional finite state
machines, as they cannot reflect the intricate quantitative valuation of an agent on how
well he has met his goal. In particular, it is not realistic to assume that these components
are always cooperating to satisfy a common goal, as it is, e.g., assumed in works that
distinguish between an environment and a system. We argue that it is more realistic to
assume that all components act like selfish agents that try to achieve their own objec-
tives and are either unconcerned about the effect this has on the other components or
consider this effect to be secondary. It is indeed a recent trend to enhance the system
models used in the classical approach of verification by quantitative cost and gain func-
tions, and to exploit the well established game-theoretic framework [21,22] for their
formal analysis.
The first steps towards the extension of computational models with concepts from
classical game theory were taken by advancing from boolean to general two-player
zero-sum games played on graphs [15]. Like their qualitative counter parts, those games
are adequate to model controller-environment interaction problems [24,25]. As usual
in control theory, one can distinguish between moves of a control player, who plays
actions to control a system to meet a control objective, and an antagonistic environment
player. In the classical setting, the control player has a qualitative objective—he might,
for example, try to enforce a temporal specification—whereas the environment tries
to prevent this. In the extension to quantitative games, the controller instead tries to
maximise its gain, while the environment tries to minimise it. This extension lifts the
controller synthesis problem from a constructive extension of a decision problem to a
classical optimisation problem.
However, this extension has not lifted the restriction to purely antagonist interac-
tions between a controller and a hostile environment. In order to study more complex
systems with more than two components, and with objectives that are not necessar-
ily antagonist, we resort to multiplayer non zero-sum games. In this context, Nash
equilibria [21] take the place that winning and optimal strategies take in qualitative
and quantitative two-player games zero-sum games, respectively. Surprisingly, quali-
tative objectives have so far prevailed in the study of Nash equilibria for distributed
systems. However, we argue that Nash equilibria for selfish agents with quantitative
objectives—such as reaching a set of target states quickly or with a minimal consump-
tion of energy—are natural objectives that aught to be studied alongside (or instead of)
traditional qualitative objectives.
Consequently, we study Nash equilibria for multiplayer non zero-sum games played
on graphs with quantitative objectives.
Our contribution. In this paper, we study turn-based multiplayer non zero-sum
games played on finite graphs with quantitative objectives, expressed through a cost
function for each player (cost games). Each cost function assigns, for every play of the
game, a value that represents the cost that is incurred for a player by this play. Cost func-
tions allow to express classical quantitative objectives such as quantitative reachability
(i.e., the player aims at reaching a subset of states as soon as possible), or mean-payoff
objectives. In this framework, all players are supposed to be rational: they want to min-
imise their own cost or, equivalently, maximise their own gain. This invites the use of
Nash equilibria as the adequate concept for cost games.
Our results are twofold. Firstly, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria for a large
class of cost games that includes quantitative reachability and mean-payoff objectives.
Secondly, we study the complexity of these Nash equilibria in terms of the memory
needed in the strategies of the individual players in these Nash equilibria. More pre-
cisely, we ensure existence of Nash equilibria whose strategies only requires a number
of memory states that is linear in the size of the game for a wide class of cost games,
including games with quantitative reachability and mean-payoff objectives.
The general philosophy of our work is as follows: we try to derive existence of
Nash equilibria in multiplayer non zero-sum quantitative games (and characterization
of their complexity) through determinacy results (and characterization of the optimal
strategies) of several well-chosen two-player quantitative games derived from the mul-
tiplayer game. These ideas were already successfully exploited in the qualitative frame-
work [16], and in the case of limit-average objectives [26].
Related work. Several recent papers have considered two-player zero-sum games
played on finite graphs with regular objectives enriched by some quantitative aspects.
Let us mention some of them: games with finitary objectives [10], mean-payoff parity
games [11], games with prioritised requirements [1], request-response games where the
waiting times between the requests and the responses are minimized [18,28], games
whose winning conditions are expressed via quantitative languages [2], and recently,
cost-parity and cost-Streett games [13].
Other work concerns qualitative non zero-sum games. In [16], general criteria ensur-
ing existence of Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria (resp. secure equilibria)
are provided for multiplayer (resp. 2-player) games, as well as complexity results. The
complexity of Nash equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with Bu¨chi objectives
has been discussed in [5]. [4] studies the existence of Nash equilibria for timed games
with qualitative reachability objectives
Finally, there is a series of recent results on the combination of non zero-sum as-
pects with quantitative objectives. In [3], the authors study games played on graphs
with terminal vertices where quantitative payoffs are assigned to the players. In [19],
the authors provide an algorithm to decide the existence of Nash equilibria for concur-
rent priced games with quantitative reachability objectives. In [23], the authors prove
existence of a Nash equilibrium in Muller games on finite graphs where players have a
preference ordering on the sets of the Muller table. Let us also notice that the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in cost games with quantitative reachability objectives we study
in this paper has already been established in [7]. The new proves we provide are simpler
and significantly improve the complexity of the strategies constructed from exponential
to linear in the size of the game.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we present the model of multiplayer cost
games and define the problems we study. The main results are given in Section 3. Fi-
nally, in Section 4, we apply our general result on particular cost games with classical
objectives. Omitted proofs and additional materials can be found in the Appendix.
2 General Background
In this section, we define our model of multiplayer cost game, recall the concept of
Nash equilibrium and state the problems we study.
Definition 1. A multiplayer cost game is a tuple G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E, (Costi)i∈Π)
where
• Π is a finite set of players,
• G = (V,E) is a finite directed graph with vertices V and edges E ⊆ V × V ,
• (Vi)i∈Π is a partition of V such that Vi is the set of vertices controlled by player i,
and
• Costi : Plays→ R∪{+∞,−∞} is the cost function of player i, where Plays is the
set of plays in G, i.e. the set of infinite paths through G. For every play ρ ∈ Plays,
the value Costi(ρ) represents the amount that player i loses for this play.
Cost games are multiplayer turn-based quantitative non zero-sum games. We assume
that the players are rational: they play in a way to minimise their own cost.
Note that minimising cost or maximising gain are essentially3 equivalent, as max-
imising the gain for player i can be modelled by using Costi to be minus this gain
and then minimising the cost. This is particularly important in cases where two players
have antagonistic goals, as it is the case in all two-player zero-sum games. To cover
these cases without changing the setting, we sometimes refer to maximisation in order
to preserve the connection to such games in the literature.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each vertex has at least one outgoing
edge. Moreover, it is sometimes convenient to specify an initial vertex v0 ∈ V of the
game. We then call the pair (G, v0) an initialised multiplayer cost game. This game is
played as follows. First, a token is placed on the initial vertex v0. Whenever a token is
on a vertex v ∈ Vi controlled by player i, player i chooses one of the outgoing edges
(v, v′) ∈ E and moves the token along this edge to v′. This way, the players together
determine an infinite path through the graphG, which we call a play. Let us remind that
Plays is the set of all plays in G.
A history h of G is a finite path through the graph G. We denote by Hist the set of
histories of a game, and by ǫ the empty history. In the sequel, we write h = h0 . . . hk,
where h0, . . . , hk ∈ V (k ∈ N), for a history h, and similarly, ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . ., where
ρ0, ρ1, . . . ∈ V , for a play ρ. A prefix of length n+ 1 (for some n ∈ N) of a play ρ =
ρ0ρ1 . . . is the finite history ρ0 . . . ρn. We denote this history by ρ[0, n].
Given a history h = h0 . . . hk and a vertex v such that (hk, v) ∈ E, we denote by hv
the history h0 . . . hkv. Moreover, given a history h = h0 . . . hk and a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . .
such that (hk, ρ0) ∈ E, we denote by hρ the play h0 . . . hkρ0ρ1 . . ..
The function Last (resp. First) returns, for a given history h = h0 . . . hk, the last
vertex hk (resp. the first vertex h0) of h. The function First naturally extends to plays.
A strategy of player i in G is a function σ : Hist→ V assigning to each history h ∈
Hist that ends in a vertex Last(h) ∈ Vi controlled by player i, a successor v = σ(h)
of Last(h). That is,
(
Last(h), σ(h)
)
∈ E. We say that a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . of G is
consistent with a strategy σ of player i if ρk+1 = σ(ρ0 . . . ρk) for all k ∈ N such that
ρk ∈ Vi. A strategy profile of G is a tuple (σi)i∈Π of strategies, where σi refers to a
strategy for player i. Given an initial vertex v, a strategy profile determines the unique
play of (G, v) that is consistent with all strategies σi. This play is called the outcome
of (σi)i∈Π and denoted by 〈(σi)i∈Π〉v . We say that a player deviates from a strategy
(resp. from a play) if he does not carefully follow this strategy (resp. this play).
3 Sometimes the translation implies minor follow-up changes, e.g., the replacement of lim inf
by lim sup and vice versa.
A finite strategy automaton for player i ∈ Π over a game G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π ,
E, (Costi)i∈Π) is a Mealy automaton Ai = (M,m0, V, δ, ν) where:
– M is a non-empty, finite set of memory states,
– m0 ∈M is the initial memory state,
– δ : M × V →M is the memory update function,
– ν : M × Vi → V is the transition choice function, such that (v, ν(m, v)) ∈ E for
all m ∈M and v ∈ Vi.
We can extend the memory update function δ to a function δ∗ : M×Hist→M defined
by δ∗(m, ǫ) = m and δ∗(m,hv) = δ(δ∗(m,h), v) for all m ∈ M and hv ∈ Hist.
The strategy σAi computed by a finite strategy automaton Ai is defined by σAi (hv) =
ν(δ∗(m0, h), v) for all hv ∈ Hist such that v ∈ Vi. We say that σ is a finite-memory
strategy if there exists4 a finite strategy automaton A such that σ = σA. Moreover, we
say that σ = σA has a memory of size at most |M |, where |M | is the number of states
of A. In particular, if |M | = 1, we say that σ is a positional strategy (the current vertex
of the play determines the choice of the next vertex). We call (σi)i∈Π a strategy profile
with memory m if for all i ∈ Π , the strategy σi has a memory of size at most m. A
strategy profile (σi)i∈Π is called positional or finite-memory if each σi is a positional
or a finite-memory strategy, respectively.
We now define the notion of Nash equilibria in this quantitative framework.
Definition 2. Given an initialised multiplayer cost game (G, v0), a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π
is a Nash equilibrium in (G, v0) if, for every player j ∈ Π and for every strategy σ′j of
player j, we have:
Costj(ρ) ≤ Costj(ρ
′)
where ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0 and ρ′ = 〈σ′j , σi∈Π\{j}〉v0 .
This definition means that, for all j ∈ Π , player j has no incentive to deviate from
σj since he cannot strictly decrease his cost when using σ′j instead of σj . Keeping
notations of Definition 2 in mind, a strategy σ′j such that Costj(ρ) > Costj(ρ′) is
called a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π .
Example 3. Let G = (Π,V, V1, V2, E,Cost1,Cost2) be the two-player cost game whose
graph G = (V,E) is depicted in Figure 1. The states of player 1 (resp. 2) are repre-
sented by circles (resp. squares)5. Thus, according to Figure 1, V1 = {A,C,D} and
V2 = {B}. In order to define the cost functions of both players, we consider a price
function π : E → {1, 2, 3}, which assigns a price to each edge of the graph. The
price function6 π is as follows (see the numbers in Figure 1): π(A,B) = π(B,A) =
π(B,C) = 1, π(A,D) = 2 and π(C,B) = π(D,B) = 3. The cost function Cost1 of
player 1 expresses a quantitative reachability objective: he wants to reach the vertex C
4 Note that there exist several finite strategy automata such that σ = σA.
5 We will keep this convention through the paper.
6 Note that we could have defined a different price function for each player. In this case, the
edges of the graph would have been labelled by couples of numbers.
(shaded vertex) while minimising the sum of prices up to this vertex. That is, for every
play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . of G:
Cost1(ρ) =
{∑n
i=1 π(ρi−1, ρi) if n is the least index s.t. ρn = C,
+∞ otherwise.
As for the cost function Cost2 of player 2, it expresses a mean-payoff objective: the cost
of a play is the long-run average of the prices that appear along this play. Formally, for
any play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . of G:
Cost2(ρ) = lim sup
n→+∞
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
π(ρi−1, ρi).
Each player aims at minimising the cost incurred by the play. Let us insist on the fact
that the players of a cost game may have different kinds of cost functions (as in this
example).
A B C
D
1
1
1
3
2 3
Fig. 1. A two-player cost game G.
An example of a play in G can be given by ρ = (AB)ω , leading to the costs
Cost1(ρ) = +∞ and Cost2(ρ) = 1. In the same way, the play ρ′ = A(BC)ω induces
the following costs: Cost1(ρ) = 2 and Cost2(ρ) = 2.
Let us fix the initial vertex v0 at the vertexA. The play ρ = (AB)ω is the outcome of
the positional strategy7 profile (σ1, σ2) where σ1(A) = B and σ2(B) = A. Moreover,
this strategy profile is in fact a Nash equilibrium: player 2 gets the least cost he can
expect in this game, and player 1 has no incentive to choose the edge (A,D) (it does
not allow the play to pass through vertex C).
We now consider the positional strategy profile (σ′1, σ′2) with σ′1(A) = B and
σ′2(B) = C. Its outcome is the play ρ′ = A(BC)ω . However, this strategy profile is
not a Nash equilibrium, because player 2 can strictly lower his cost by always choosing
the edge (B,A) instead of (B,C), thus lowering his cost from 2 to 1. In other words,
the strategy σ2 (defined before) is a profitable deviation for player 2 w.r.t. (σ′1, σ′2).
The questions studied in this paper are the following ones:
Problem 1 Given a multiplayer cost game G, does there exist a Nash equilibrium in G?
Problem 2 Given a multiplayer cost game G, does there exist a finite-memory Nash
equilibrium in G?
7 Note that player 1 has no choice in vertices C and D, that is, σ1(hv) is necessarily equal to B
for v ∈ {C,D} and h ∈ Hist.
Obviously enough, if we make no restrictions on our cost games, the answer to
Problem 1 (and thus to Problem 2) is negative (see Example 4). Our first goal in this
paper is to identify a large class of cost games for which the answer to Problem 1 is
positive. Then we also positively reply to Problem 2 for subclasses of the previously
identified class of cost games. Both results can be found in Section 3.
Example 4. Let (G, A) be the initialised one-player cost game depicted below, whose
cost function Cost1 is defined by Cost1(AnBω) = 1n for n ∈ N0 and Cost1(A
ω) =
+∞. One can be convinced that there is no Nash equilibrium in this initialised game.
A B
In order to our class of cost games, we need the notions of Min-Max cost games,
determinacy and optimal strategies. The following two definitions are inspired by [27].
Definition 5. A Min-Max cost game is a tuple G = (V, VMin, VMax, E,CostMin,GainMax),
where
• G = (V,E) is a finite directed graph with vertices V and edges E ⊆ V × V ,
• (VMin, VMax) is a partition of V such that VMin (resp. VMax) is the set of vertices
controlled by player Min (resp. Max), and
• CostMin : Plays → R ∪ {+∞,−∞} is the cost function of player Min, that repre-
sents the amount that he loses for a play, and GainMax : Plays → R ∪ {+∞,−∞}
is the gain function of player Max, that represents the amount that he wins for a
play.
In such a game, player Min wants to minimise his cost, while player Max wants to
maximise his gain. So, a Min-Max cost game is a particular case of a two-player cost
game. Let us stress that, according to this definition, a Min-Max cost game is zero-sum
if CostMin = GainMax, but this might not always be the case8. We also point out that
Definition 5 allows to take completely unrelated functions CostMin and GainMax, but
usually they are similar (see Definition 15). In the sequel, we denote by ΣMin (resp.
ΣMax) the set of strategies of player Min (resp. Max) in a Min-Max cost game.
Definition 6. Given a Min-Max cost game G, we define for every vertex v ∈ V the
upper value Val∗(v) as:
Val∗(v) = inf
σ1∈ΣMin
sup
σ2∈ΣMax
CostMin(〈σ1, σ2〉v) ,
and the lower value Val∗(v) as:
Val∗(v) = sup
σ2∈ΣMax
inf
σ1∈ΣMin
GainMax(〈σ1, σ2〉v) .
The game G is determined if, for every v ∈ V , we have Val∗(v) = Val∗(v). In this
case, we say that the game G has a value, and for every v ∈ V , Val(v) = Val∗(v) =
8 For an example, see the average-price game in Definition 15.
Val∗(v). We also say that the strategies σ⋆1 ∈ ΣMin and σ⋆2 ∈ ΣMax are optimal strategies
for the respective players if, for every v ∈ V , we have that
inf
σ1∈ΣMin
GainMax(〈σ1, σ
⋆
2〉v) = Val(v) = sup
σ2∈ΣMax
CostMin(〈σ
⋆
1 , σ2〉v) .
If σ⋆1 is an optimal strategy for player Min, then he loses at most Val(v) when playing
according to it. On the other hand, player Max wins at least Val(v) if he plays according
to an optimal strategy σ⋆2 for him.
Examples of classical determined Min-Max cost games can be found in Section 4.
3 Results
In this section, we first define a large class of cost games for which Problem 1 can be
answered positively (Theorem 10). Then, we study existence of simple Nash equilib-
ria (Theorems 13 and 14). To define this interesting class of cost games, we need the
concepts of cost-prefix-linear and coalition-determined cost games.
Definition 7. A multiplayer cost game G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E, (Costi)i∈Π) is cost-
prefix-linear if, for every player i ∈ Π , every vertex v ∈ V and history hv ∈ Hist, there
exists a ∈ R and b ∈ R+ such that, for every play ρ ∈ Plays with First(ρ) = v, we
have:
Costi(hρ) = a+ b · Costi(ρ) .
Let us now define the concept of coalition-determined cost games.
Definition 8. A multiplayer cost game G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E, (Costi)i∈Π) is (positio-
nally/finite-memory) coalition-determined if, for every player i ∈ Π , there exists a gain
function GainiMax : Plays→ R ∪ {+∞,−∞} such that
– Costi ≥ Gain
i
Max, and
– the Min-Max cost game Gi = (V, Vi, V \ Vi, E,Costi,GainiMax), where player i
(player Min) plays against the coalition Π \ {i} (player Max), is determined and
has (positional/finite-memory) optimal strategies for both players. That is: ∃σ⋆i ∈
ΣMin, ∃σ
⋆
−i ∈ ΣMax (both positional/finite-memory) such that ∀v ∈ V
inf
σi∈ΣMin
GainiMax(〈σi, σ
⋆
−i〉v) = Val
i(v) = sup
σ−i∈ΣMax
Costi(〈σ
⋆
i , σ−i〉v) .
Given i ∈ Π , note that Gi does not depend on the cost functions Costj , with j 6= i.
Example 9. Let us consider the two-player cost game G of Example 3, where player 1
has a quantitative reachability objective (Cost1) and player 2 has a mean-payoff objec-
tive (Cost2). We show that G is positionally coalition-determined.
Let us set Gain1Max = Cost1 and study the Min-Max cost game G1 = (V, V1, V2,
E,Cost1,Gain
1
Max), where player Min (resp. Max) is player 1 (resp. 2) and wants to
minimiseCost1 (resp. maximiseGain1Max). This game is positionally determined [27,14].
We define positional strategies σ⋆1 and σ⋆−1 for player 1 and player 2, respectively,
in the following way: σ⋆1(A) = B and σ⋆−1(B) = A. From A, their outcome is
〈(σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
−1)〉A = (AB)
ω
, and Cost1((AB)ω) = Gain1Max((AB)ω) = +∞. One can
check that the strategies σ⋆1 and σ⋆−1 are optimal in G1. Note that the positional strat-
egy σ˜⋆1 defined by σ˜⋆1(A) = D is also optimal (for player 1) in G1. With this strategy, we
have that 〈(σ˜⋆1 , σ⋆−1)〉A = (ADB)ω , andCost1((ADB)ω) = Gain
1
Max((ADB)
ω)= +∞.
We now examine the Min-Max cost game G2 = (V, V2, V1, E,Cost2,Gain2Max),
where Gain2Max is defined as Cost2 but with lim inf instead of lim sup. In this game,
player Min (resp. Max) is player 2 (resp. 1) and wants to minimise Cost2 (resp. max-
imise Gain2Max). This game is also positionally determined [27,14]. Let σ⋆2 and σ⋆−2
be the positional strategies for player 2 and player 1, respectively, defined as follows:
σ⋆2(B) = C and σ⋆−2(A) = D. From A, their outcome is 〈(σ⋆2 , σ⋆−2)〉A = AD(BC)ω ,
and Cost2(AD(BC)ω) = Gain2Max(AD(BC)ω) = 2. We claim that σ⋆2 and σ⋆−2 are the
only positional optimal strategies in G2.
Theorem 10 positively answers Problem 1 for cost-prefix-linear, coalition-determined
cost games.
Theorem 10. In every initialised multiplayer cost game that is cost-prefix-linear and
coalition-determined, there exists a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let (G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E, (Costi)i∈Π), v0) be an initialised multiplayer cost
game that is cost-prefix-linear and coalition-determined. Thanks to the latter property,
we know that, for every i ∈ Π , there exists a gain function GainiMax such that the Min-
Max cost game Gi = (V, Vi, V \ Vi, E,Costi,GainiMax) is determined and there exist
optimal strategies σ⋆i and σ⋆−i for player i and the coalition Π \ {i} respectively. In
particular, for j 6= i, we denote by σ⋆j,i the strategy of player j derived from the strategy
σ⋆−i of the coalition Π \ {i}.
The idea is to define the required Nash equilibrium as follows: each player i plays
according to his strategy σ⋆i and punishes the first player j 6= i who deviates from his
strategy σ⋆j , by playing according to σ⋆i,j (the strategy of player i derived from σ⋆−j in
the game Gj ).
Formally, we consider the outcome of the optimal strategies (σ⋆i )i∈Π from v0, and
set ρ := 〈(σ⋆i )i∈Π〉v0 . We need to specify a punishment function P : Hist→ Π ∪ {⊥}
that detects who is the first player to deviate from the play ρ, i.e. who has to be punished.
For the initial vertex v0, we define P (v0) = ⊥ (meaning that nobody has deviated from
ρ) and for every history hv ∈ Hist, we let:
P (hv) :=


⊥ if P (h) = ⊥ and hv is a prefix of ρ,
i if P (h) = ⊥, hv is not a prefix of ρ, and Last(h) ∈ Vi,
P (h) otherwise (P (h) 6= ⊥).
Then the definition of the Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π in G is as follows. For all i ∈ Π
and h ∈ Hist such that Last(h) ∈ Vi,
τi(h) :=
{
σ⋆i (h) if P (h) = ⊥ or i,
σ⋆
i,P (h)(h) otherwise.
Clearly the outcome of (τi)i∈Π is the play ρ (= 〈(σ⋆i )i∈Π〉v0 ).
Now we show that the strategy profile (τi)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in G. As a con-
tradiction, let us assume that there exists a profitable deviation τ ′j for some player j ∈
Π . We denote by ρ′ := 〈τ ′j , (τi)i∈Π\{j}〉v0 the outcome where player j plays according
to his profitable deviation τ ′j and the players of the coalition Π \ {j} keep their strate-
gies (τi)i∈Π\{j} . Since τ ′j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π , we have
that:
Costj(ρ
′) < Costj(ρ). (1)
As both plays ρ and ρ′ start from vertex v0, there exists a history hv ∈ Hist such
that ρ = h〈(τi)i∈Π〉v and ρ′ = h〈τ ′j , (τi)i∈Π\{j}〉v (remark that h could be empty).
Among the common prefixes of ρ and ρ′, we choose the history hv of maximal length.
By definition of the strategy profile (τi)i∈Π , we can write in the case of the outcome ρ
that ρ = h〈(σ⋆i )i∈Π〉v . Whereas in the case of the outcome ρ′, player j does not follow
his strategy σ⋆j any more from vertex v, and so, the coalition Π \ {j} punishes him by
playing according to the strategy σ⋆−j after history hv, and so ρ′ = h〈τ ′j , σ⋆−j〉v (see
Figure 2).
v0
h
v
ρ= h〈(σ⋆i )i∈Π 〉vρ
′ =h〈τ ′j ,σ
⋆
−j〉v
Fig. 2. Sketch of the tree representing the unravelling of the game G from v0.
Since σ⋆−j is an optimal strategy for the coalition Π \ {j} in the determined Min-
Max cost game Gj , we have:
Val
j(v) = inf
σj∈ΣMin
Gain
j
Max(〈σj , σ
⋆
−j〉v)
≤ GainjMax(〈τ
′
j , σ
⋆
−j〉v)
≤ Costj(〈τ
′
j , σ
⋆
−j〉v) . (2)
The last inequality comes from the hypothesis Costj ≥ GainjMax in the game Gj .
Moreover, the game G is cost-prefix-linear, and then, when considering the history
hv, there exist a ∈ R and b ∈ R+ such that
Costj(ρ
′) = Costj(h〈τ
′
j , σ
⋆
−j〉v) = a+ b · Costj(〈τ
′
j , σ
⋆
−j〉v) . (3)
As b ≥ 0, Equations (2) and (3) imply:
Costj(ρ
′) ≥ a+ b · Valj(v) . (4)
Since h is also a prefix of ρ, we have:
Costj(ρ) = Costj(h〈(σ
⋆
i )i∈Π〉v) = a+ b · Costj(〈(σ
⋆
i )i∈Π〉v) . (5)
Furthermore, as σ⋆j is an optimal strategy for player j in the Min-Max cost game Gj , it
follows that:
Valj(v) = sup
σ−j∈ΣMax
Costj(〈σ
⋆
j , σ−j〉v)
≥ Costj(〈(σ
⋆
i )i∈Π〉v) . (6)
Then, Equations (5) and (6) imply:
Costj(ρ) ≤ a+ b · Val
j(v) . (7)
Finally, Equations (4) and (7) lead to the following inequality:
Costj(ρ) ≤ a+ b · Val
j(v) ≤ Costj(ρ
′) ,
which contradicts Equation (1). The strategy profile (τi)i∈Π is then a Nash equilibrium
in the game G. ⊓⊔
Remark 11. The proof of Theorem 10 remains valid for cost functions Costi : Plays→
K , where 〈K,+, ·, 0, 1,≤〉 is an ordered field. This allows for instance to consider non-
standard real costs and enjoy infinitesimals to model the costs of a player.
Example 12. Let us consider the initialised two-player cost game (G, A) of Example 3,
where player 1 has a quantitative reachability objective (Cost1) and player 2 has a mean-
payoff objective (Cost2). One can show that G is cost-prefix-linear. Since we saw in Ex-
ample 9 that this game is also positionally coalition-determined, we can apply the con-
struction in the proof of Theorem 10 to get a Nash equilibrium in G. The construction
from this proof may result in two different Nash equilibria, depending on the selection
of the strategies σ⋆1 /σ˜⋆1 , σ⋆−1, σ⋆2 and σ⋆−2 as defined in Example 9.
The first Nash equilibrium (τ1, τ2) with outcome ρ = 〈σ⋆1 , σ⋆2〉A = A(BC)ω is
given, for any history h, by:
τ1(hA) :=
{
B if P (hA) = {⊥, 1}
D otherwise ; τ2(hB) :=
{
C if P (hB) = {⊥, 2}
A otherwise
where the punishment function P is defined as in the proof of Theorem 10 and depends
on the play ρ. The cost for this finite-memory Nash equilibrium is Cost1(ρ) = 2 =
Cost2(ρ).
The strategy τ˜1 of the second Nash equilibrium (τ˜1, τ2) with outcome ρ˜ = 〈σ˜⋆1 , σ⋆2〉A =
AD(BC)ω is given by τ˜1(hA) := D for all history h. The cost for this finite-memory
Nash equilibrium is Cost1(ρ˜) = 6 and Cost2(ρ˜) = 2, respectively.
Note that there is no positional Nash equilibrium with outcome ρ (resp. ρ˜).
The two following theorems provide results about the complexity of the Nash equi-
librium defined in the latter proof. Applications of these theorems to specific classes of
cost games are provided in Section 4.
Theorem 13. In every initialised multiplayer cost game that is cost-prefix-linear and
positionally coalition-determined, there exists a Nash equilibrium with memory (at
most) |V |+ |Π |.
Theorem 14. In every initialised multiplayer cost game that is cost-prefix-linear and
finite-memory coalition-determined, there exists a Nash equilibrium with finite memory.
The proofs of these two theorems rely on the construction of the Nash equilibrium
provided in the proof of Theorem 10.
4 Applications
In this section, we exhibit several classes of classical objectives that can be encoded in
our general setting. The list we propose is far from being exhaustive.
4.1 Qualitative Objectives
Multiplayer games with qualitative (win/lose) objectives can naturally be encoded via
multiplayer cost games; for instance via cost functions Costi : Plays → {1,+∞},
where 1 (resp. +∞) means that the play is won (resp. lost) by player i. Let us now
consider the subclass of qualitative games with prefix-independent9 Borel objectives.
Given such a game G, we have that G is coalition-determined, as a consequence of the
Borel determinacy theorem [20]. Moreover the prefix-independence hypothesis obvi-
ously guarantees that G is also cost-prefix-linear (by taking a = 0 and b = 1). By
applying Theorem 10, we obtain the existence of a Nash equilibrium for qualitative
games with prefix-independent Borel objectives. Let us notice that this result is already
present in [16].
When considering more specific subclasses of qualitative games enjoying a posi-
tional determinacy result, such as parity games [15], we can apply Theorem 13 and
ensure existence of a Nash equilibrium whose memory is (at most) linear.
4.2 Classical Quantitative Objectives
We here give four well-known kinds of Min-Max cost games and see later that they are
determined. For each sort of game, the cost and gain functions are defined from a price
function (and a reward function in the last case), which labels the edges of the game
graph with prices (and rewards).
Definition 15 ([27]). Given a game graph G = (V, VMin, VMax, E), a price function π :
E → R that assigns a price to each edge, a diverging10 reward function ϑ : E → R that
assigns a reward to each edge, and a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . in G, we define the following
Min-Max cost games:
9 An objective Ω ⊆ V ω is prefix-independent if only if for every play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ V ω, we
have that ρ ∈ Ω iff for every n ∈ N, ρnρn+1 . . . ∈ Ω.
10 For all plays ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . in G, it holds that limn→∞ |
∑n
i=1 ϑ(ρi−1, ρi)| = +∞. This is
equivalent to requiring that every cycle has a positive sum of rewards.
(i) a reachability-price game is a Min-Max cost game G = (G,RPMin,RPMax) together
with a given goal set Goal ⊆ V , where
RPMin(ρ) = RPMax(ρ) =
{
π(ρ[0, n]) if n is the least index s.t. ρn ∈ Goal,
+∞ otherwise,
with π(ρ[0, n]) =
∑n
i=1 π(ρi−1, ρi);
(ii) a discounted-price game is a Min-Max cost game G = (G,DPMin(λ),DPMax(λ))
together with a given discount factor λ ∈ ]0, 1[, where
DPMin(λ)(ρ) = DPMax(λ)(ρ) = (1− λ) ·
+∞∑
i=1
λi−1π(ρi−1, ρi) ;
(iii) an average-price game11 is a Min-Max cost game G = (G,APMin,APMax), where
APMin(ρ) = lim sup
n→+∞
π(ρ[0, n])
n
and APMax(ρ) = lim inf
n→+∞
π(ρ[0, n])
n
;
(iv) a price-per-reward-average game is a Min-Max cost game G = (G,PRAvgMin,
PRAvgMax), where
PRAvgMin(ρ) = lim sup
n→+∞
π(ρ[0, n])
ϑ(ρ[0, n])
and PRAvgMax(ρ) = lim inf
n→+∞
π(ρ[0, n])
ϑ(ρ[0, n])
,
with ϑ(ρ[0, n]) =
∑n
i=1 ϑ(ρi−1, ρi).
An average-price game is then a particular case of a price-per-reward-average game.
Let us remark that, in Example 3, the cost function Cost1 (resp. Cost2) corresponds
to RPMin with Goal = {C} (resp. APMin). The game G1 (resp. G2) of Example 9 is a
reachability-price (resp. average-price) game.
The following theorem is a well-known result about the particular cost games de-
scribed in Definition 15.
Theorem 16 ([27,14]). Reachability-price games, discounted-price games, average-
price games, and price-per-reward games are determined and have positional optimal
strategies.
This result implies that a multiplayer cost game where each cost function is RPMin,
DPMin, APMin or PRAvgMin is positionally coalition-determined. Moreover, one can
show that such a game is cost-prefix-linear. Theorem 17 then follows from Theorem 13.
Theorem 17. In every initialised multiplayer cost game G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E,
(Costi)i∈Π) where the cost function Costi belongs to {RPMin,DPMin,APMin,
PRAvgMin} for every player i ∈ Π , there exists a Nash equilibrium with memory (at
most) |V |+ |Π |.
11 When the cost function of a player is APMin, we say that he has a mean-payoff objective.
Note that the existence of finite-memory Nash equilibria in cost games with quantita-
tive reachability objectives has already been established in [7,8]. Even if not explicitly
stated in the previous papers, one can deduce from the proof of [8, Lemma 16] that
the provided Nash equilibrium has a memory (at least) exponential in the size of the
cost game. Thus, Theorem 17 significantly improves the complexity of the strategies
constructed in the case of cost games with quantitative reachability objectives.
4.3 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Objectives
Multiplayer cost games allow to encode games combining both qualitative and quanti-
tative objectives, such as mean-payoff parity games [11]. In our framework, where each
player aims at minimising his cost, the mean-payoff parity objective could be encoded
as follows: Costi(ρ) = APMin(ρ) if the parity condition is satisfied, +∞ otherwise.
The determinacy of mean-payoff parity games, together with the existence of opti-
mal strategies (that could require infinite memory) have been proved in [11]. This result
implies that multiplayer cost games with mean-payoff parity objectives are coalition-
determined. Moreover, one can prove that such a game is also cost-prefix-linear (by
taking a = 0 and b = 1). By applying Theorem 10, we obtain the existence of a Nash
equilibrium for multiplayer cost games with mean-payoff parity objectives. As far as
we know, this is the first result about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in cost games
with mean-payoff parity games.
Remark 18. Let us emphasise that Theorem 10 applies to cost games where the players
have different kinds of cost functions (as in Example 3). In particular, one player could
have a qualitative Bu¨chi objective, a second player a discounted-price objective, a third
player a mean-payoff parity objective,. . .
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Technical Appendix
A Example of a cost game which is not cost-prefix-linear
Example 19. Multiplayer cost games allow to encode energy games. Let G be a cost
game defined by means of a price function π : E → R, that assigns a price to each
edge. In our framework, where each player aims at minimising his cost, an energy
objective [6] (with threshold T ∈ R) could be encoded as follows:
Costi(ρ) =
{
supn≥0 π(ρ[0, n]) if supn≥0 π(ρ[0, n]) ≤ T
+∞ otherwise,
with π(ρ[0, n]) =
∑n
i=1 π(ρi−1, ρi).
A B
+1 -1+1
-1
Fig. 3. A cost game which is not cost-prefix-linear
Let us consider the one-player cost game with an energy objective (with threshold
T = 2) depicted in Figure 3. We show that this game is not cost-prefix-linear. For
this, we exhibit a history hv ∈ Hist such that for all a, b ∈ R there exists a play
ρ ∈ Plays with First(ρ) = v, such that Cost1(hρ) 6= a + b · Cost1(ρ). We in fact
give a play ρ independent of a and b. Let hv be the history AAABA and ρ be the play
(AB)ω . We have that Cost1(ρ) = 1 and Cost1(hρ) = Cost1(AA(AB)ω) = +∞, since
supn≥0 π((hρ)[0, n]) = 3, which is above the threshold T = 2. It is thus impossible to
find a, b ∈ R such that:
+∞ = Cost1(hρ) = a+ b · Cost1(ρ) = a+ b.
B Remark about secure and subgame perfect equilibria
Remark 20. It would be tempting to try to prove the existence of subgame perfect equi-
libria or secure equilibria12 in multiplayer cost games with techniques similar to the
proof of Theorem 10. However, our definition of the Nash equilibrium in the proof of
Theorem 10 is (in general) neither a subgame perfect equilibrium, nor a secure equilib-
rium. To see this, let us consider the following two cost games G and H, whose graphs
are depicted on Figure 4 and 5 respectively. Both games are initialised in vertex A.
The game G is a two-player cost game where the vertices of player 1 (resp. 2) are
represented by circles (resp. squares), that is, V1 = {B,C,D,E, F} and V2 = {A}.
12 The definitions of subgame perfect and secure equilibria in this context can be found in [9].
AB C
D E F
Fig. 4. Game G.
A
B
C D
Fig. 5. Game H.
The cost functions of both players are RPMin, with13 Goal1 = Goal2 = {D,E} and the
price function π : E → R defined by π(e) = 1 for any edge e ∈ E (same price function
for the two players). It means that both players have reachability objectives and want to
reach vertex D or E within the least number of edges.
Let us study the two Min-Max cost games G1 and G2. In the game G1, let σ⋆1 be
defined as σ⋆1(C) = E and σ⋆−1 be defined as σ⋆−1(A) = C. Then, σ⋆1 and σ⋆−1 are
positional optimal strategies for player Min (player 1) and player Max (player 2) re-
spectively. In the game G2, we define σ⋆2 and σ⋆−2 as σ⋆2(A) = B and σ⋆−2(C) = F .
These two strategies of G2 are positional optimal strategies for player Min (player 2)
and player Max (player 1) respectively.
If we define a Nash equilibrium (τ1, τ2) in G exactly as in the proof of Theorem 10,
depending on these strategies σ⋆1 , σ⋆−1, σ⋆2 and σ⋆−2, then (τ1, τ2) is not a subgame per-
fect equilibrium in G. Indeed, (τ1|A, τ2|A) is not a Nash equilibrium in the subgameG|A
with history AC: player 1 punishes player 2 by choosing the edge (C,F ) (according to
σ⋆−2) whereas player 1 could pay a smaller cost by choosing the edge (C,E).
Furthermore, this Nash equilibrium also gives a counter-example of subgame per-
fect equilibrium for other classical punishments (see [22], e.g., punish the last player
who has deviated and only for a finite number of steps).
Let us now consider the two-player cost game H where V1 = {A,B} and V2 =
{C,D} (see Figure 5). The price function and the cost functions of the two players are
the same as in the game G, except that here Goal1 = {A,C} and Goal2 = {C}. Note
that player 2 does not really play in H, only player 1 has a choice to make: he can
choose the edge (B,C) or the edge (B,D).
As before, we study the two Min-Max cost gamesH1 andH2. Let σ⋆1 be a positional
strategy of player 1 in H1 such that σ⋆1(B) = C, and σ⋆−2 be a positional strategy of
player 1 inH2 such that σ⋆−2(B) = D. These strategies are optimal in the two respective
games. Then, we define a Nash equilibrium in H in the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 10, depending on σ⋆1 and σ⋆−2. Actually, this is not a secure equilibrium in
H because player 1 can strictly increase player 2’s cost while keeping his own cost,
by choosing the edge (B,D) instead of following σ⋆1 (σ⋆1 suggests to choose the edge
(B,C)).
13 In both figures, shaded (resp. doubly circled) vertices represent the goal set Goal1 (resp.
Goal2).
C Proof of Theorem 13
Theorem 13 states that in every initialised multiplayer cost game that is cost-prefix-
linear and positionally coalition-determined, there exists a Nash equilibrium with mem-
ory (at most) |V |+ |Π |.
Proof. Let (G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E, (Costi)i∈Π), v0) be an initialised multiplayer cost
game that is cost-prefix-linear and positionally coalition-determined. For this proof, we
keep the notations introduced in the proof of Theorem 10. In particular, we consider
the Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π as defined in the latter proof, whose outcome is ρ :=
〈(σ⋆i )i∈Π〉v0 . We recall that for all i ∈ Π , the strategy τi depends on the strategies σ⋆i
(optimal strategy in Gi) and σ⋆i,j (derived from the optimal strategy σ⋆−j in Gj ) for j ∈
Π \ {i}. As the game G is now positionally coalition-determined by hypothesis, these
strategies are assumed to be positional. This proof consists in showing that (τi)i∈Π is a
strategy profile with memory (at most) |V |+ |Π |.
For this purpose, we define a finite strategy automaton for each player that remem-
bers the play ρ and who has to be punished. As the play ρ is the outcome of the po-
sitional strategy profile (σ⋆i )i∈Π , we can write ρ := v0 . . . vk−1(vk . . . vn)ω where
0 ≤ k ≤ n ≤ |V |, vl ∈ V for all 0 ≤ l ≤ n and these vertices are all different.
For any i ∈ Π , let Ai = (M,m0, V, δ, ν) be the strategy automaton of player i, where:
– M = {v0v0, v0v1, . . . , vn−1vn, vnvk} ∪Π \ {i}.
As we want to be sure that the play ρ is followed by all players, we need to mem-
orise which movement (edge) has to be chosen at each step of ρ. This is the role
of {v0v0, v0v1, . . . , vn−1vn, vnvk}. But in case a player deviates from ρ, we only
have to remember this player during the rest of the play (no matter if another player
later deviates from ρ). This is the role of Π \ {i}.
– m0 = v0v0 (this memory state means that the play has not begun yet).
– δ : M × V →M is defined in this way: given m ∈M and v ∈ V ,
δ(m, v) :=


j if m = j ∈ Π or
(m = u1u2, with u1, u2 ∈ V , v 6= u2 and u1 ∈ Vj ),
vlvl+1 if m = uvl for a certain l ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, u ∈ V ,
and v = vl,
vnvk otherwise (m = uvn and v = vn).
Intuitively, m represents either a player to punish, or the edge that should, if fol-
lowing ρ, have been chosen at the last step of the current stage of the play, and v is
the real last vertex of the current stage of the play.
Notice that in this definition of δ, j is different from i because if player i follows the
strategy computed by this strategy automaton, one can be convinced that he does
not deviate from the play ρ.
– ν : M × Vi → V is defined in this way: given m ∈M and v ∈ Vi,
ν(m, v) :=


σ⋆i (v) if m = u1u2 with u1, u2 ∈ V and v = u2,
σ⋆i,j(v) if m = j ∈ Π or
(m = u1u2, with u1, u2 ∈ V , v 6= u2 and u1 ∈ Vj).
The idea is to play according to σ⋆i if everybody follows the play ρ, and switch to
σ⋆i,j if player j is the first player who has deviated from ρ.
Obviously, the strategy σAi computed by the strategy automaton Ai exactly corre-
sponds to the strategy τi of the Nash equilibrium. And so, we can conclude that each
strategy τi requires a memory of size at most |M | ≤ |Π |+ |V |. ⊓⊔
D Example 3 continued
Example 21. Thanks to the proof of Theorem 13, we can construct a finite strategy
automaton A1 that computes the strategy τ1 of player 1 given in Example 12. The set
M of memory states is M = {AA,AB,BC,CB} ∪ {2} since ρ = A(BC)ω , and
the initial state is m0 = AA. The memory update function δ : M × V → M and the
transition choice function ν : M ×V1 → V are depicted in Figure 6: a label v/v′ on an
edge (m1,m2) means that δ(m1, v) = m2, and ν(m1, v) = v′ if v ∈ V1. If v /∈ V1, we
indicate that ν does not return any advice by a ‘−’, and label the edge with v/−.
AA AB BC
CB
2
A/B B/−
C/B
B/−
A/D A/D
Fig. 6. The finite strategy automaton A1.
E Sketch of proof of Theorem 14
Theorem 14 states that in every initialised multiplayer cost game that is cost-prefix-
linear and finite-memory coalition-determined, there exists a Nash equilibrium with fi-
nite memory.
Proof (Sketch). The proof follows the same philosophy than the proof of Theorem 13
and keeps the same notations. Again we consider the Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π defined
in the proof of Theorem 10, whose outcome is ρ := 〈(σ⋆i )i∈Π〉v0 . We recall that for
all i ∈ Π , the strategy τi depends on the strategies σ⋆i and σ⋆i,j for j ∈ Π \ {i}. As
the game G is finite-memory coalition-determined by hypothesis, these strategies are
assumed to be finite-memory. Given i ∈ Π and j ∈ Π \ {i}, we denote by Aσ⋆i (resp.
Aσ
⋆
i,j ) a finite strategy automaton for the strategy σ⋆i (resp. σ⋆i,j ).
As in the proof of Theorem 13, each player needs to remember both the play ρ and
who has to be punished. But here the play ρ is not anymore the outcome of a positional
strategy profile: each σ⋆i is a finite-memory strategy. Nevertheless, in some sense, we
can see the σ⋆i ’s as positional strategies played on the product graph G×Aσ
⋆
1 × · · · ×
Aσ
⋆
|Π|
. This allows us to write ρ := v0 . . . vk−1(vk . . . vn)ω where14 0 ≤ k ≤ n ≤
|V | ·
∏
j∈Π |A
σ⋆j |, vl ∈ V for all 0 ≤ l ≤ n. Like in the proof of Theorem 13, we
can now define, for any i ∈ Π , Aτi , a finite strategy automaton for τi. In order to build
explicitly Aτi , we need to take into account, on one hand, the path ρ, and on the other
hand, the memory of the punishing strategies σ⋆i,j . This enables to bound the size ofAτi
by |V | ·
∏
j∈Π |A
σ⋆j |+
∑
j∈Π\{i} |A
σ⋆i,j |. ⊓⊔
F Remark on the particular Min-Max cost games of Definition 15
Remark 22. Note that reachability-price and discounted-price games are zero-sum15
games, whereas the two other ones are not. For example, let us consider the average-
price game G depicted on Figure 7. The vertices of this game are A and B, and the
number 0 or 1 associated to an edge corresponds with the price of this edge (π(A,B) =
π(B,B) = 1 and the price of the other edges is zero).
A B
1
0
0 1
Fig. 7. Average-price game G.
Let ρ be the playABAB2A2B4A4 . . . B2nA2n . . ., whereAi means the concatena-
tion of i A. Then the sequence of prices appearing along ρ is 1012021404 . . . 12n02n . . .,
and so we get: APMin(ρ) = 23 and APMax(ρ) =
1
2 . As these costs are not equal, the
average-price game G depicted on Figure 7 is not a zero-sum game. Since an average-
price game is a special case of price-per-reward-average game, we can conclude that
these two kinds of games are non zero-sum games.
G Part of the proof of Theorem 17
Proposition 23. Let G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E, (Costi)i∈Π) be a multiplayer cost game
where the cost function Costi belongs to {RPMin,DPMin,APMin,PRAvgMin} for each
i ∈ Π . Then the game G is cost-prefix-linear and positionally coalition-determined.
Proof. Let G be a a multiplayer cost game where each cost function is RPMin, DPMin,
APMin or PRAvgMin. Let us first prove that the game G is cost-prefix-linear. Given j ∈
Π , v ∈ V and hv ∈ Hist, we consider the four possible cases for Costj . Let π : E → R
be a price function and ϑ : E → R be a diverging reward function. For the sake of
simplicity, we write hv := h0 . . . hk with k ∈ N, hk = v and hl ∈ V for l = 0, . . . , k.
14 |A| denotes the number of states of the automaton A.
15 Let us recall that a Min-Max cost game is zero-sum if and only if CostMin = GainMax.
Moreover, to avoid heavy notation, we do not explicitly show the dependency between
Goal and j in the first case or between λ and j in the second case.
(i) Case Costj = RPMin for a given goal set Goal ⊆ V :
Let us distinguish two situations. If there exists l ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that hl ∈ Goal,
then we set a :=
∑n
i=1 π(hi−1, hi) ∈ R and b := 0 ∈ R+, where n is the least
index such that hn ∈ Goal. Let ρ be a play with First(ρ) = v, then it implies
that RPMin(hρ) =
∑n
i=1 π(hi−1, hi) = a+ b · RPMin(ρ) (with the convention that
0 ·+∞ = 0).
If there does not exist l ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that hl ∈ Goal, then we set a :=∑k
i=1 π(hi−1, hi) ∈ R and b := 1 ∈ R+. Let ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . be a play such that
First(ρ) = v. If RPMin(ρ) is infinite, then RPMin(hρ) = +∞ = a + b · RPMin(ρ).
Otherwise, if n is the least index in N such that ρn ∈ Goal, then we have that:
RPMin(hρ) =
k∑
i=1
π(hi−1, hi) +
n∑
i=1
π(ρi−1, ρi)
= a+ b · RPMin(ρ).
(ii) Case Costj = DPMin(λ) for a given discount factor λ ∈ ]0, 1[:
We set a := (1 − λ)
∑k
i=1 λ
i−1π(hi−1, hi) ∈ R and b := λk ∈ R+. Given a play
ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . such that First(ρ) = v and η := hρ ∈ Plays (with η = η0η1 . . .), we
have that:
DPMin(λ)(hρ) = DPMin(λ)(η)
= (1− λ)
+∞∑
i=1
λi−1π(ηi−1, ηi)
= (1− λ)
k∑
i=1
λi−1π(ηi−1, ηi) + (1− λ)
+∞∑
i=k+1
λi−1π(ηi−1, ηi)
= (1− λ)
k∑
i=1
λi−1π(hi−1, hi) + λ
k(1− λ)
+∞∑
i=1
λi−1π(ρi−1, ρi)
= a+ b · DPMin(λ)(ρ) .
(iii) Case Costj = APMin:
We set a := 0 ∈ R and b := 1 ∈ R+. Given ρ ∈ Plays such that First(ρ) = v and
η := hρ ∈ Plays (with η = η0η1 . . .), we show that:
APMin(hρ) = APMin(η) = APMin(ρ) .
If APMin(η) = APMin(ρ) = +∞ or −∞, the desired result obviously holds. Oth-
erwise, let us set xn := 1n
∑n
i=1 π(ηi−1, ηi) and yn :=
1
n
∑n
i=1 π(ρi−1, ρi), for all
n ∈ N0. By properties of the limit superior and definition of the APMin function, it
holds that:
lim sup
n→+∞
(xn − yn) ≥ APMin(η)− APMin(ρ) ≥ lim inf
n→+∞
(xn − yn) .
It remains to prove that the sequence (xn − yn)n∈N converges to 0. For all n > k,
we have that:
|xn − yn| =
∣∣∣ 1n · (∑ni=1 π(ηi−1, ηi)−∑k+ni=k+1 π(ηi−1, ηi))∣∣∣
= 1
n
·
∣∣∣∑ki=1 π(ηi−1, ηi)−∑n+ki=n+1 π(ηi−1, ηi)∣∣∣ .
As the absolute value is bounded independently of n (let us remind that E is finite),
we can conclude that (xn − yn)n∈N converges to 0, and so APMin(η) = APMin(ρ).
(iv) Case Costj = PRAvgMin:
We set a := 0 ∈ R and b := 1 ∈ R+. Given ρ ∈ Plays such that First(ρ) = v and
η := hρ ∈ Plays (with η = η0η1 . . .), we show that:
PRAvgMin(hρ) = PRAvgMin(η) = PRAvgMin(ρ) .
Thanks to several properties of lim sup, we have that:
PRAvgMin(ρ) = lim sup
n→+∞
∑n
i=1 π(ρi−1, ρi)∑n
i=1 ϑ(ρi−1, ρi)
= lim sup
n→+∞
∑n
i=1 π(ηk+i−1 , ηk+i)∑n
i=1 ϑ(ηk+i−1, ηk+i)
= lim sup
n→+∞
∑n+k
i=1 π(ηi−1, ηi)−
∑k
i=1 π(ηi−1, ηi)∑n+k
i=1 ϑ(ηi−1, ηi)−
∑k
i=1 ϑ(ηi−1, ηi)
= lim sup
n→+∞
∑n+k
i=1 π(ηi−1, ηi)∑n+k
i=1 ϑ(ηi−1, ηi)−
∑k
i=1 ϑ(ηi−1, ηi)
(8)
= lim sup
n→+∞
∑n+k
i=1 π(ηi−1, ηi)∑n+k
i=1 ϑ(ηi−1, ηi)
·
1
1−
∑
k
i=1 ϑ(ηi−1,ηi)∑n+k
i=1
ϑ(ηi−1,ηi)
= lim sup
n→+∞
∑n+k
i=1 π(ηi−1, ηi)∑n+k
i=1 ϑ(ηi−1, ηi)
(9)
= lim sup
n→+∞
∑n
i=1 π(ηi−1, ηi)∑n
i=1 ϑ(ηi−1, ηi)
= PRAvgMin(η) = PRAvgMin(hρ) .
Line (8) comes from the fact that the reward function ϑ is diverging, and from the
following property: if limn→+∞ bn = b ∈ R, then lim supn→+∞(an + bn) =
(lim supn→+∞ an) + b. Line (9) is implied by this property: if limn→+∞ bn =
b > 0, then lim supn→+∞(an · bn) = (lim supn→+∞ an) · b.
Note that, if the history h is empty, then k = 0 and, in all cases, a is equal to 0 and b to
1. This actually implies that Costi(hρ) = Costi(ρ) holds.
Let us now prove that the game G is positionally coalition-determined. Given a
player i ∈ Π , if Costi = RPMin, then we take GainiMax = RPMax. We do the same for
the other cases by defining the gain function GainiMax for the coalition as the counterpart
of Costi in Definition 15. Clearly, it holds that Costi ≥ GainiMax. Moreover, the Min-
Max cost game Gi = (V, Vi, V \Vi, E,Costi,GainMax) is determined and has positional
optimal strategies by Theorem 16. ⊓⊔
